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1. Introduction 
Game theoretical studies on the formation and stability of international environmental 
agreements (IEAs) have pointed out that strong free-rider incentives exist and that these 
prevent agreements from being effective (e.g. Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 
Barrett 1994, 1997, Jeppesen and Andersen 1998). A common characteristic of these studies 
is that the participants in international negotiations are treated as monolithic and benevolent 
governments that truly represent the common interests of their nation.  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that governments only care about the aggregated welfare level of their respective 
country. Thus, in this view, welfare maximization is the main force that drives environmental 
policy decisions. However, recent events in the international policy arena have illustrated the 
fact that national political actors (e.g. lobby groups and voters) are able to affect 
environmental policy-making, both at the national and the international level.1  
Even though the game theoretical analysis of IEAs has yielded many important insights, it 
ignores the fact that governments often have interests not in line with those of their 
constituency. Moreover, it does not consider that the electoral process and the lobby groups 
may influence what these governments would do at the international negotiation tables.  In 
particular, lobby groups (e.g. business associations and environmental NGOs) may be able to 
affect the behavior of politicians by providing information, by financing election campaigns, 
or by bringing environmental concerns to the forefront of the minds of the voters (Grossman 
and Helpman 2001). These political factors play an important role when the national 
representatives meet at the international level to decide, for instance, whether or not they will 
participate in an IEA. 
                                                          
1 In 2002, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), a conservative lobby group in the USA, intended to 
discredit the USA’s Environmental Protection Agency report on global warming. Moreover, in 2003, the CEI 
sued other government climate research bodies that produced evidence for global warming (The Observer, 
2003). In 2005, Scientific Alliance, a British lobby group linked to Exxon Mobile, published a report 
challenging current views about potential effects of climate change (The Guardian, 2005).  
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Most of the studies on the influence of interest groups on policy-making focus on the role of 
producer groups in the determination of trade policies. In this area, the political contributions 
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996) is a standard model. Grossman 
and Helpman study the effect of lobby contributions on trade policies. They consider self-
interested policy-makers who seek to maximize the sum of lobby contributions and the 
welfare of the median voter in order to increase their chances to be reelected. The political 
contributions approach has further been applied to study environmental policy-making (e.g. 
Fredriksson 1997, Aidt 1998, Conconi 2003, Fredriksson et al. 2005, Fredriksson et al. 2007).  
Fredriksson (1997) shows that there is a relation between the strength of lobby activities and 
the deviation from an optimal pollution tax. Aidt (1998) explains that lobby groups, through 
the competitive political process, are important to internalize production externalities. 
Conconi (2003) shows that the impact of lobby groups on environmental policy depends on 
the trade policy regime and the size of the transboundary environmental spillovers. Finally, 
Fredriksson et al. (2005) empirically show, for OECD countries, that there is an effect of 
lobby actions on policy-making and that it is more likely to occur in countries with 
sufficiently high levels of political competition. In very recent empirical work Fredriksson et 
al. (2007) show that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has been facilitated by 
environmental lobbying in particular in countries with a lower integrity of government.   
A theoretical analysis that combines the influence of interest groups (e.g. using the political 
contributions approach) and stability of IEAs is largely missing. Only Haffoudhi (2005) has 
studied the impact of lobby groups on the size and stability of IEAs for homogeneous 
countries. She finds that a global agreement would be sustained by means of industry lobby 
contributions. The aim of this paper is to develop a model in which a government's decision 
about IEA participation and abatement policies are influenced by lobby groups. In our model, 
lobby groups organize a collective action to influence government decisions. We model this 
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by means of contributions that reflect the willingness to pay of a lobby to change the 
government’s policies in its favor.  
Our analysis has four distinguishing characteristics. First, as in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), we assume that lobbies try to influence government’s policy decisions and we abstract 
from the election process. We represent lobbies’ influence as prospective contributions that 
enter into the government’s political revenue function and are made conditional on a change 
of government’s policy decisions. Secondly, different from Grossman and Helpman (1994), 
we do not model lobbying as a menu auction where exogenously given lobby groups offer 
contribution schedules to policy-makers. We assume, instead, following Felli and Merlo 
(2005), that a government chooses the lobby from which it will receive contributions. Thirdly, 
different from Haffoudhi (2005), we consider heterogeneous world regions and use an 
empirical model to compute results. Finally, following Hillman and Ursprung (1992, 1994), 
we compare two model variants where governments consider the contributions from 
supergreen and green environmentalist lobby groups. Supergreens are concerned about global 
environmental damages, whereas greens are only concerned about the environmental impacts 
that affect their own region. 
This paper is the first to study the effect of lobbying on the size and stability of IEAs with an 
empirically meaningful model. It extends previous work in two directions. First, we extend 
the literature on IEAs to include political pressure (modeled by means of prospective lobby 
contributions) on governments’ decisions when signing an agreement. Second, we 
demonstrate the potential impacts of lobbying with the help of the STAbility of COalitions 
(STACO) model introduced by Dellink et al. (2004). STACO combines an empirical climate 
change module comprising 12 world regions with a game theoretical module to investigate the 
stability of coalitions of any subset of regions. This allows us, with appropriate modifications, 
to study the impact of the pressure from lobby groups on the stability of climate coalitions and 
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the resulting environmental and economic effects. We test for stability using the concept of 
internal and external stability (d’Aspremont et al., 1983). A coalition is said to be stable if no 
member region wants to leave the coalition (internal stability) and no other region wants to 
accede to the coalition (external stability). 
The results from our analysis show that, first, lobby contributions may help to establish an 
international climate agreement (ICA) that would not emerge in the absence of lobbying. 
However, the stable agreement provides little additional greenhouse gas abatement and 
achieves only a small fraction of the potential welfare gains. Secondly, we find that it is not 
straightforward to assume that regions participating in an ICA will always be influenced by an 
environmentalist lobby. We show that a member of a stable agreement may well collect 
industry contributions and thus abate less than in the absence of lobbying.  
The structure of the paper is as follows, the next section presents our analytical framework. 
Section 3 describes the empirical calibration of the payoff function including the lobby 
contribution schemes. Section 4 presents and analyzes the main results. Finally, section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
2. Analytical framework 
We set up a model of coalition formation with lobby contributions. In the model, the 
government in each region i N∈  seeks to maximize its own political revenue considering the 
pressure from lobby groups. We model lobby pressure as prospective contributions that reflect 
the willingness to pay of a lobby to influence the government’s policy decisions in their favor. 
Contributions, thus, represent the monetary value assigned to all lobbying activities that 
influence the government’s decisions.2 The political revenue function has two components. 
First, it is a function of the regional net benefits of climate policy. This may include the net 
                                                          
2 Some authors argue that contributions may be interpreted as bribes in order to influence government 
policies (see Schulze and Ursprung, 2001). 
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benefits of participating in an ICA. Second, political revenue depends on the contributions 
from lobby groups. We assume that only two groups of citizens can overcome the problems 
involved with organizing a lobby (e.g. organizational costs and free-riding) described by 
Olson (1965) and actually form effective lobby groups. Hence, following a common 
assumption in the literature (see Grossman and Helpman 1996, Aidt 1998 and Conconi 2003), 
we assume exogenously given lobby groups. In particular, we assume that an 
environmentalist ( iE ) and an industry lobby ( iI ) are active in region i. Lobby groups are 
indexed by { }i i ih E , I∈ . Furthermore, we consider two types of environmentalists, 
supergreens (S) and greens (G), thus { }i i iE S ,G∈ .  
The political revenue function of government i, iπ , reflects the benefits and costs of 
greenhouse gas abatement and the prospective contributions, 
ih
L , from lobby group ih  
supporting the government’s policy. We assume that either industry or environmentalists, but 
not both, support a chosen policy. More specifically, a government that implements an 
abatement level iq  receives contributions from the environmentalists if iq  is higher and 
industry contributions if iq  is lower than a certain benchmark level of abatement. Details of 
the specification are explained in section 3.3 below. The political revenue function is  
ii i i i i i h i
(q ) B (q) C (q ) L (q )π = − +ρ ⋅ ,        [1] 
where iB  are the total discounted benefits from global abatement i
i N
q q
∈
=∑ , and iC  are the 
total discounted abatement costs from regional abatement iq . We assume that iB  is concave, 
i.e. i iB q 0∂ ∂ >  and 2 2i iB q 0∂ ∂ ≤ , iC  is strictly convex, i.e. i iC q 0∂ ∂ >  and 2 2i iC q 0∂ ∂ > , 
and that BAUi iq [0, e ]∈  where BAUie  is the emission level in the Business-as-usual scenario 
with no abatement. The parameter i 0ρ ≥  captures the relative weight of contributions 
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compared to net benefits from abatement. For simplicity we assume that i jρ = ρ = ρ  for all 
i, j N∈ .3 Finally, 
ih
L 0≥ , represents the total discounted contributions from a regional lobby 
and we assume that for the environmentalist lobby 
iE i
L q 0∂ ∂ > , 
i
2 2
E iL q 0∂ ∂ ≤ , and for the 
industry lobby  
iI i
L q 0∂ ∂ < , 
I
2 2
I iL q 0∂ ∂ < . 
We model the formation of ICAs as a two-stage game of cartel formation. At the first stage, 
regions decide on membership. At the second stage, regions choose their abatement strategies. 
At the first stage, we assume that regions can choose between two membership strategies: to 
sign or not to sign an ICA. Those who sign an ICA become signatories, i.e. members of a 
coalition K N⊆ . If no region or only a single region signs the ICA, then K is not effective 
and the singleton coalition structure emerges. If K N= , the grand coalition emerges. In our 
empirical setting, with 12 heterogeneous players (regions), the game renders 212 – 12 = 4084 
different coalition structures. 
A non-signatory government chooses an abatement level that maximizes its political revenue 
given by expression [1]. Signatory governments commit in the agreement to account for the 
benefits of abatement that accrue to all coalition members. Thereby, the positive externalities 
of abatement are internalized among coalition members. Hence, a signatory government 
i K∈  maximizes 
( ) ( )
ij i i h i
j K
B q C (q ) L q
∈
− +ρ⋅∑ .        [2] 
We do not follow the standard assumption in coalition formation games that the coalition 
behaves like a single player and plays non-cooperatively against non-signatories and we do 
                                                          
3 As explained before a “contribution” do not represent actual payments, but are rather a device to capture the 
value of very different sorts of activities. Because of lack of reliable empirical data on these activities we 
assume that lobbies have equal influence on governments across regions.  
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not assume joint profit maximization.4 Each government maximizes its political revenue 
subject to the obligation from the agreement if it is signed. The Nash equilibrium of the 
resulting abatement game gives a unique abatement vector. 
We consider the situation without lobby contributions as our base case. Setting 
ih
L 0=  in [1] 
we obtain the first order condition, for the base case, of a government as a singleton: 
i i i i iB (q) q C (q ) q∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ .         [3] 
Setting 
ih
L 0=  in [2] we obtain the first order condition of a coalition member in the base 
case  
j i i i i
j K
B (q) q C (q ) q
∈
∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂∑ .        [4] 
From [1] we obtain the first order condition for a singleton with lobby contributions 
ii i h i i i i i
B (q) q L (q ) q C (q ) q∂ ∂ +ρ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ .       [5] 
From [2] we obtain the first order condition for a coalition member 
ij i h i i i i i
j K
B (q) q L (q ) q C (q ) q
∈
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ +ρ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦∑ .      [6] 
Comparing [5] and [6] with [3] and [4] we observe that lobby contributions enter as an extra 
term on the marginal benefits side (left-hand side of these expressions). Hence, as long as 
ih i i
L (q ) q 0∂ ∂ ≠  the abatement levels of singletons and coalition members will be different 
from the corresponding levels in the base case. Furthermore, expression [4] is the condition of 
an efficient provision of abatement for coalition K (Samuelson condition).5 Hence, comparing 
                                                          
4  As assumed by Barrett (1994), Chander and Tulkens (1995) and Dellink et al. (2006) among others. 
5 Global efficiency is obtained if K = N. 
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[4] and [6] we observe that lobby contributions distort efficiency of coalitional abatement. 
Marginal contributions (
ih i i
L (q ) q∂ ∂ ) make coalition members to move away from the 
efficient level of abatement. This is further discussed below once we have introduced our 
specification of lobby contributions.  
3. Calibration of the model 
In this section we describe the main features of the calibration of the empirical module of the 
STAbility of COalitions (STACO) model – see Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2006) 
for a detailed description of the calibration. STACO has been used to examine effects of 
exclusive membership (Finus et al. 2005), permit trading (Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 
2006) and surplus sharing (Weikard et al. 2006) on the stability of ICAs. STACO calculates 
payoffs (in terms of net benefits) for each region and each coalition structure. These payoffs 
are used to check for stability. The regions considered are USA, Japan, European Union (EU-
15), other OECD countries (O-OECD), Eastern European countries (EE), former Soviet 
Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China, India, dynamic Asian economies 
(DAE), Brazil and "rest of the world" (ROW).6 STACO considers a time horizon of 100 years 
starting in 2010, focuses on abatement of CO2 emissions, and uses a uniform 2% discount rate 
for the calculation of the net present value of the net benefits of abatement. We adopt the 
same specification. In section 4.2 we present a sensitivity analysis varying the discount rate. 
Finally, we assume stationary abatement strategies, i.e. a constant abatement level over the 
time horizon of our model. 
                                                          
6 EU-15 comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. O-OECD includes among others Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. EE includes, among others, Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic. EEX includes, 
among others, the Middle East Countries, Mexico, Venezuela and Indonesia. DAE comprises South Korea, 
Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. ROW includes South Africa, Morocco and many countries in Latin 
America and Asia. For details, see Babiker et al. (2001).  
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3.1. The benefit function 
The STACO calibration of the benefit function is based on a linear approximation of the 
damage cost function of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994). We assume that the benefits of 
global abatement are derived from reduced environmental damages from CO2 emissions and 
that each region receives a share of the global benefits. The resulting (discounted) regional 
benefit function, ( )iB q , is expressed as 
( )i i BB q q= μ ⋅δ ⋅           [7] 
where iμ  is region i’s share of the benefits ( i
i N
1
∈
μ =∑ ) from global abatement i
i N
q q
∈
=∑  and 
Bδ  is a parameter that captures the discounting of benefits of abatement and the stock effects 
of CO2 emissions. The parameter Bδ  represents the global marginal benefits in STACO.7 
From [7] follows that the regional marginal benefits are constant and equal to i Bμ δ . The 
regional parameters for the benefit function are listed in Appendix A, Table A.1. With 
constant marginal benefits all regions have dominant abatement strategies. The chosen 
abatement level, the solutions of [5] or [6], is independent of others’ abatement. Thus, there 
are no leakage effects in our model. The literature on the stability of IEAs recognizes that a 
setting with linear benefit functions offers the most favorable conditions for forming stable 
coalitions (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Finus 2001, 2003). 
3.2. The abatement costs function 
For the specification of the abatement cost function we rely on estimates from the EPPA 
model (Ellerman and Decaux 1998). The regional (discounted) abatement costs are given by  
                                                          
7 We use the calibration suggested by Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2006) who use B 37.4 $ / tonδ =  of 
carbon. 
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( ) 3 2i i C i i i i1 1C q q q3 2
⎡ ⎤= δ ξ + ζ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦          [8] 
where iξ  and iζ  are regional parameters and Cδ  captures the discounting of abatement costs.8  
The regional parameters for the abatement cost function are listed in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
In our setting, the large industrialized regions are the main beneficiaries of global abatement 
whereas energy exporting countries, the dynamic Asian economies and Brazil receive the 
smallest share of global benefits. The marginal abatement costs vary widely: China and USA 
have relatively flat curves whereas Brazil and Japan have relatively steep curves. 
3.3. Lobby payoffs and contributions 
To specify the lobby contribution functions, we assume that the environmentalist lobby 
contributions are related to the increase of environmental benefits as a result of the regional 
abatement policy. Thus, the environmentalist lobby contributes if the government decides to 
increase abatement above a benchmark level, giq , that would be chosen by the government in 
the absence of lobby contributions. We define giq  as the equilibrium abatement level in the 
base case. Following Hillman and Ursprung (1992 and 1994), we assume that the 
environmentalist lobby may be either supergreen or green. A supergreen lobby is concerned 
(by self-interest, aesthetic or altruistic motives) about global environmental impacts of 
regional environmental policies. A green lobby is concerned only about the regional 
environmental impacts of the regional abatement polices.  
                                                          
8 As in Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2006), we use C 43.1 $ / tonδ =  of carbon. 
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The contribution function for a supergreen lobby iS  is  
( )
i
g g
B i i i i
S g
i i
q q for q q
L
0 for q q .
⎧ε ⋅δ − ≥⎪= ⎨ <⎪⎩
        [9] 
The contribution function for a green lobby iG  is 
( )
i
g g
i B i i i i
G g
i i
q q for q q
L
0 for q q .
⎧ε ⋅μ ⋅δ − ≥⎪= ⎨ <⎪⎩
        [10] 
In [9] and [10], ε  is a parameter ( 0 1< ε < ) that reflects the strength of the willingness to pay 
of environmentalist lobbies for increased abatement. The parameter Bδ  is included in these 
expressions because lobby contributions, for consistency, have to be discounted in order to be 
included in the political revenue function of singletons and coalition members – see 
expressions [1] and [2]. Moreover, we assume that environmentalist contributions are linked 
to the benefits from abatement and that the stock effects of CO2 emissions are also recognized 
by the environmentalist lobby. Hence, the discount factor of the benefit function is applied.  
For further calculations and analysis, we need to determine giq . We find the singleton coalition 
structure to be the unique stable coalition in the base case. Hence, the corresponding 
abatement levels serve as the reference abatement levels ( giq ) to determine contributions. It is 
clear from [9] and [10] that the more the actual abatement exceeds giq  the higher the 
contributions of both types of environmentalist lobbies. 
Next, we assume that the industry is always harmed by the abatement decision of the 
government, given that the abatement costs are usually carried by the industry. Industry 
contributions are linked to the discounted costs saved when abatement levels are lower 
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than giq . Thus, considering expression [8] and assuming that the industry uses the same 
discount rate Cδ  for contributions and abatement, we get: 
( ) ( )
i
3 2g 3 g 2 gi i
C i i i i i i
I
g
i i
q q q q for q q
3 2L
0 for q q .
⎧ ξ ζ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤δ − + − ≤⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= ⎩ ⎭⎨⎪ >⎩
     [11] 
From expression [11] it is clear that an industry lobby pays higher contributions the more the 
actual abatement level is below the government’s benchmark decision without lobby 
contributions.  
4. Results and sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we present the results from our analysis for the base case, we examine the 
implication of lobby contributions and provide a sensitivity analysis.  
Table 1 reports results of the base case. We find that all regions undertake some abatement 
effort even in the absence of an agreement – i.e. in the singleton coalition structure. The 
heterogeneity of the regions, in terms of cost-benefit structure (see Appendix A, Table A.1), 
implies different levels of abatements. For instance, USA undertakes the largest abatement 
effort in the singleton coalition structure given its low marginal abatement costs and high 
marginal benefits. Also China undertakes important abatement efforts because it has the 
lowest marginal costs. In contrast, regions like Brazil or the energy exporting countries (EEX) 
that have high marginal cost and low marginal benefits have little incentive to abate.  
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Table 1: Singleton Coalition Structure (Base case) 
Regions Abatement 
over century 
Average 
annual 
abatement  
Abatement 
costs over 
century 
Benefits from 
abatement 
over century
Payoff over 
century 
Marginal 
abatement 
costs  
Marginal 
benefits  
 
gton 
% of 
emissions in 
2010 
bln US$ bln US$ bln US$ US$/ton US$/ton 
USA 16 6.7 53 468 415 8.5 8.5 
Japan 1 1.4 2 357 354 6.5 6.5 
EU-15 7 4.7 24 488 464 8.8 8.8 
O-OECD 2 3.1 1 71 71 1.3 1.3 
EE 1 1.8 0 27 27 0.5 0.5 
FSU 5 4.9 4 140 135 2.5 2.5 
EEX 1 0.7 0 62 62 1.1 1.1 
China 15 6.6 16 128 112 2.3 2.3 
India 3 5.3 3 103 101 1.9 1.9 
DAE 1 1.3 0 52 51 0.9 0.9 
Brazil 0 0.1 0 32 32 0.6 0.6 
ROW 4 5.3 4 141 137 2.5 2.5 
World 55 4.6 109 2,069 1,960 - - 
4.1. Main results and stability analysis 
A first analysis shows two features of our setting. First, from the first order conditions 
presented in Section 2 we know that i i i i iB (q) q C (q ) q∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  for singletons in our base 
case and that 
ii i h i i i i i
B (q) q L (q ) q C (q ) q∂ ∂ +ρ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  for singletons in the case with lobby 
contributions. Considering our empirical calibration (see section 3) these conditions imply 
that a region, acting as a singleton, has a higher abatement level than in the base case if it 
receives contributions from the environmentalist lobby (because 
iE i i
L (q ) q 0∂ ∂ > ) and has a 
lower abatement level than in the base case if it receives contributions from the industry lobby 
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(because 
iI i i
L (q ) q 0∂ ∂ < ) – see also Appendix B expressions [B1]-[B4]. Second, the 
decision of whether or not to take lobby contributions is independent of the decisions of the 
remaining regions concerning lobby contributions and coalition membership – both for 
singletons and coalition members. This is a result of the presence of constant marginal 
benefits – which imply dominant abatement strategies – in our model. Dominant strategies 
allow us to calculate regional abatement and corresponding lobby contributions without 
considering the behavior of other regions.  
Note that the numerical results of this section are obtained assuming that the relative weight 
of contributions compared to social welfare, ρ , is equal to 1. Hence, we assume that 
governments give equal weight to the net benefits from abatement and to lobby contributions. 
We modify this assumption in the sensitivity analysis of section 4.2. In Table 2, we show the 
results for the singleton coalition structure once we include lobby contributions. We note that 
the influence of lobbies on abatement levels and on net benefits depends mainly on the type of 
environmentalist lobby. When we consider a supergreen lobby, contributions have a positive 
effect on global abatement and consequently on global payoff. For the singleton coalition 
structure, we find an increase in abatement of about 40 % compared to the base case. Global 
abatement increases even though there are three regions (USA, Japan and EU-15) that receive 
industry contributions and hence reduce their abatement below base case levels. However, 
when we consider a green lobby, contributions have a negative effect on global abatement. 
There is a decrease of 40 % compared with the base case. We find that all regions take 
contributions from the industry lobby and reduce their abatement levels below those of the 
base case. 
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Table 2: Results for singleton coalition structure with lobby contributions (supergreen 
and green lobbies) 
 Industry or supergreen lobby contributions  Industry or green lobby contributions 
Region Abatement 
over century 
Net benefits 
over century 
Contributions 
over century a)
 Abatement 
over century 
Net benefits 
over century 
Contributions 
over century a)
 (Gton) (bln $) (bln $)  (Gton) (bln $) (bln $) 
USA 11 657 35*  11 273 35* 
Japan 0 514 2*  0 221 2* 
EU-15 4 696 16*  4 296 16* 
O-OECD 4 97 7  1 44 1* 
EE 3 34 9  1 17 0* 
FSU 8 185 11  3 85 3* 
EEX 3 83 8  0 39 0* 
China 31 106 58  9 75 11* 
India 7 133 14  2 64 2* 
DAE 2 69 6  0 32 0* 
Brazil 0 45 0  0 20 0* 
ROW 7 186 11  2 86 3* 
World 80 2,804 176  34 1,252 73 
Note: a) regions indicated with an * are receiving industry contributions, otherwise they receive environmentalist 
contributions. 
In the base case, a singleton region chooses the abatement level giq  that maximizes net 
benefits from abatement – see expression [3]. From expressions [9]-[11], and for all 0ρ > , 
we know that any compromise on the abatement level of the government (i.e. for any gi iq q≠ ) 
will be rewarded with a contribution from one of the lobbies. When gi iq q< , the industry 
makes a contribution that compensates for the foregone benefits from a lower abatement 
level. Whereas, when gi iq q> , the environmentalist makes a contribution compensating for 
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the additional abatement costs resulting from increased abatement. Hence, for all regions, any 
abatement level different from giq  results in a higher payoff than in the base case. With the 
presence of lobby groups it is always better, then, to change the abatement decision and 
collect contributions.  
The political revenue function [1] has two local optima. Figure 1 gives a schematic 
representation of its shape for a singleton government. The curves depict the political revenue 
function with industry lobby contributions Iiπ , with environmentalist contributions Eiπ  and 
without contributions iπ . In order to find the maximum political revenue we compare payoffs 
at the two local maxima. Figure 1 depicts a case where the industry is successful in 
influencing the government’s abatement decision. It is straightforward to see from Figure 1 
that it is always better to accept lobby contributions as we argued before. The local optima for 
the payoff with lobby contributions (points A and C) represent higher payoffs than the base 
case optimum (point B). 
The situation is different for coalition members. A closer inspection of the first order 
conditions for singletons and coalition members – expressions [3]-[6] – reveals that a region, 
acting as a coalition member, will always have a higher abatement level than when acting as a 
singleton, simply because coalition members take the positive externalities from abatement 
accruing to their coalition partners into account. When joining a coalition, members have to 
consider the marginal benefits of their partners. Hence, the left-hand sides of [4] and [6] 
increase. Thus [4] and [6] can only hold if the abatement level increases upon joining a 
coalition. Hence in Figure 1, the abatement level of the region as a coalition member will 
correspond to points that are to the right of points A, B and C. 
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Figure 1: Political revenue curves for a representative region as a singleton 
 
It is possible to determine for coalition members which lobby would be successful in 
influencing the abatement decision of a government. In our setting, with heterogeneous 
regions, it depends on the identity of the coalition partners, in particular on their marginal 
benefits. We find that for our specification a sufficient condition for a government’s switch 
from taking industry contributions to accept environmentalist contributions is that it forms a 
coalition with partners whose marginal benefits match or exceed its own marginal benefits. 
To see this, first consider a government that as a singleton accepts contributions from the 
industry (as in Figure 1). Its abatement decision is taken following expression [B4] – see 
appendix B. Now consider that this government enters a coalition. Using [6], [7], [8] and [11] 
we obtain  
j Bj K 2
C i i i iq q1
∈ μ δ ⎡ ⎤= δ ξ + ζ⎣ ⎦+ρ
∑
.        [12] 
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Note now that the industry would stop contribution payments if gi iq q≥ . This condition is met 
if the right hand side of [12] is at least as large as the marginal benefits in the base case. 
Hence, if government i takes industry contributions in the base case, it switches to taking 
environmentalists contributions if  
j Bj K
i B1
∈ μ δ ≥ μ δ ⇔+ρ
∑
j ij K {i}∈ − μ ≥ ρμ∑ .       [13] 
It is obvious that a government that is taking environmentalist contributions as a singleton 
will continue to do so upon entering a coalition. For our specific case where 1ρ =  we observe 
from [13] that a government switches from industry to environmentalist contributions if it 
forms a coalition with regions whose sum of marginal benefits of abatement are at least as 
large as their own. Regions accepting industry contributions as singletons do not switch to 
environmentalist contributions when joining coalition partners with a lower sum of marginal 
benefits than their own.  
We test for stability using the concept of internal and external stability. Internal stability 
means that no coalition member has an incentive to leave the coalition. External stability 
means that non-members have no incentives to join the coalition. In the base case we do not 
find a stable coalition and we find only 14 internally stable coalition structures. This indicates 
that there are strong free-rider incentives. The situation changes once we consider lobby 
contributions. We notice that lobby contributions help to reach a stable agreement. We find 
one stable coalition comprising Japan and the European Union (EU-15). This coalition is 
stable when considering industry and supergreen contributions and when considering industry 
and green contributions – see Table 3. 
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Table 3: Results for selected coalition structures 
Case Coalition 
Global abatement  
over century 
Global net benefits 
 over century 
  
 (Gton) (bln $) 
Base case 
singleton coalition* 55 1,960 
{Japan, EU-15} 59 2,056 
grand coalition 256 6,031 
    
With industry and 
supergreen contributions 
singleton coalition* 80 2,804 
{Japan, EU-15}* 83 2,908 
grand coalition 270 6,005 
    
With industry and  
green contributions 
singleton coalition* 34 1,252 
{Japan, EU-15}* 38 1,350 
grand coalition 258 6,031 
Note: * stable coalition. 
In our base case, the coalition between Japan and EU-15 is internally unstable. The extra 
benefits that EU-15 would obtain from the augmented abatement level in the coalition would 
be offset by the increase in its abatement costs. Hence, it will not join Japan but remain a 
singleton. Lobby contributions help to make this coalition stable. We find that EU-15 collects 
industry contributions in the stable coalition. At a first glance this result seems 
counterintuitive as a region will always increase abatement when joining a coalition. Why, 
then, would a region sign an agreement with the support of the industry? In the end, an 
agreement is meant to foster abatement. A closer inspection of our results reveals why a 
coalition member receives industry contributions. In the stable coalition, EU-15 indeed 
increases its abatement level compared to the singleton case (by 50%). Even after the 
increase, however, this level of abatement is still lower than its base case level. Hence, EU-15 
collects industry contributions. Furthermore, we find that at least one coalition member 
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receives industry contributions in about 1,000 of the coalitions that we tested – among these 
only the coalition of Japan and EU-15 is stable. In these coalitions, the increase in benefits is 
not sufficient to compensate for the increase in abatement costs and the loss of industry 
contributions for some members, even with supergreen contributions. Governments, thus, 
choose a compromise. They increase their abatement level from the singleton coalition 
structure but to an extent less than in the base case. Hence, they still collect from the industry. 
EU-15 will only change its decision about lobby contributions if it joins a coalition partner 
with higher marginal benefits, such as USA, or if the coalition with Japan is enlarged; see 
condition [13]. In contrast, upon joining the coalition, Japan changes its decision to take 
contributions – the marginal benefits of EU-15 clearly exceed those of Japan, see Table 3 and 
Appendix A, Table A1. In the stable coalition, Japan collects contributions from the 
supergreen or the green lobby.9 Because the coalition increases global abatement, both 
regions have larger benefits and abatement costs. For Japan, the increase in abatement costs is 
overcompensated by environmentalist contributions. 
Although lobby contributions help to stabilize a coalition, we find that this coalition does little 
to tackle climate change. From Table 3 we observe that the increase in abatement for the 
stable coalition is only a small improvement compared to the singleton coalition structure. 
Furthermore, when green and industry contributions are considered the stable coalition falls 
short of achieving the abatement level of the singleton coalition structure in the base case – 
there is 30% less abatement. The predominant effect of lobby activities is a reduction of 
abatement as governments collect industry contributions. This effect is only partly offset by 
coalition formation. We also observe that the stable coalition (Japan, EU-15) does not reap 
                                                          
9 A switch of this nature may actually happen. For instance, the administration of George Bush Sr., with the 
support of several industry lobbies, considered climate change a lesser problem. This attitude changed in the 
subsequent administration in which Vice-president Al Gore (backed by several environmentalist groups) 
heavily pushed for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Pressure Groups and Climate Agreements 
 
 21
much of the possible gains from cooperation. It closes the gap, in terms of net benefits, 
between the situation without cooperation (singleton coalition structure) and with full 
cooperation (grand coalition) by just 2% in both of our lobby cases. 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to a selection of parameters from our model. 
The aim of this exercise is to investigate whether the qualitative results presented in Section 
4.1 are robust to changes of some critical parameters of our model. We focus on three 
parameters, the strength of environmentalist lobbies’ willingness to pay for abatement policies 
( ε ), the relative weight of contributions compared to social welfare (ρ ) and the discount rate. 
Firstly, we analyze the effects of having an environmentalist lobby (supergreen or green) with 
stronger or weaker willingness to pay for increased abatement. We test this through an 
increase or decrease in the parameter ε . We change ε  from 0.1 (its original level) to 0.5 and 
0.01 in order to reflect a stronger and a weaker willingness to pay, respectively. Secondly, we 
investigate the effect of having a government that is less or more concerned about lobby 
contributions. We test this through a change in the parameter ρ  from 1 (its original level) to 
0.5 and 1.5 in order to reflect less or more concern of government about contributions. Third, 
we investigate a change in the discount rate. Note that in the STACO calibration, discounting 
enters the benefit and abatement costs functions through parameters Bδ  and Cδ  respectively. 
Following our assumption of constant abatement strategies, a change in the discount rate has 
only a scaling effect on the discounted benefits and abatement costs. Given that the parameter 
Bδ  also captures the stock effects of CO2 emissions, a change in the discount rate, however, 
has stronger scaling effects on the benefits than on the abatement costs. In STACO, an 
increase in the discount rate has a similar effect to having lower benefits or higher abatement 
costs. Conversely, lowering the discount rate has a similar effect to having higher benefits or 
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lower abatement costs. We can simplify these effects and express the variation of the discount 
rate as a re-scaling in the benefit function. Then, we perform the sensitivity analysis by 
changing the discount rate from 2% (its original level) to 1% (that is equivalent to scaling up 
benefits by a factor of 1.18) and to 3% (that is equivalent to scaling down benefits by a factor 
of 0.85). 
We find that our qualitatively results are robust to the changes in the parameters described 
above. Firstly, our stability results are quite robust. The coalition between Japan and EU-15 is 
stable under all changes of the parameters that we tested – the only exception is when ρ=1.5. 
In this case both, Japan and EU-15, would continue to take industry contributions in a 
coalition. In fact, condition [13] is not satisfied for either region. These results hold 
irrespective of the type of the environmentalist lobby. Secondly, we confirm that, for all 
parameter changes that we have examined, the influence of lobbies depends on the type and 
strength of the environmentalist lobby. When there are supergreen and industry contributions, 
both the singleton and stable coalition of Japan and EU-15 achieve better results (in terms of 
abatement and net benefits) than in the case without contributions. Whereas, when there are 
green and industry contributions, all singletons are collecting contributions from the industry 
and the abatement of the stable coalition is below the level of the singleton coalition structure 
in the base case. Third, we find that the decisions of taking contributions are also robust to a 
change in the discount rate. Only if the benefits become sufficiently high (with a discount rate 
of 1%) all governments in our regions have an incentive to change their decisions and take 
environmentalist contributions in the singleton coalition structure and in the stable coalition of 
Japan and EU-15.   
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5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we study the effect of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the size and stability 
of international climate agreements (ICAs). We study ICAs as a coalition formation process. 
The formation of ICAs is modeled as a two-stage game in which governments choose their 
participation at the first stage and their abatement strategies at the second stage – considering 
both net benefits from abatement and lobby contributions. We assume that there are two 
lobbies from which governments obtain contributions: industry and environmentalist. We 
consider that the level of contributions depends on each lobby’s payoff functions and the 
abatement strategy chosen by the government. The payoff of an environmentalist lobby 
depends on the additional abatement efforts undertaken by the government. We consider two 
types of environmentalist lobbies, supergreen and green. A supergreen lobby is interested in 
the global effects of the abatement policies. A green lobby is only interested in the regional 
effects of abatement policies. We assume that the industry lobby is always harmed if the 
government increases abatement. 
We test stability of ICAs using the concept of internal and external stability. We use the 
STAbility of COalitions (STACO) model that provides us with benefit and cost estimates for 
twelve world regions. We incorporate the level of pressure exerted by lobbies into STACO. In 
our setting, government’s political revenue depends on the abatement strategy chosen by a 
region and the prospective contributions from a lobby. We perform a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the parameters that reflect the strength of environmentalists’ willingness to pay for 
abatement policies, the relative weight of contributions compared to social welfare and the 
discount rate. We find that our main results and conclusions are robust to these changes. 
There are three key results from our analysis. Firstly, we find that in the absence of an 
agreement (i.e. the singleton coalition structure) environmentalist lobby contributions may 
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help to foster abatement efforts. When we consider supergreen and industry lobby 
contributions, we find that the singleton coalition structure improves upon our base case. 
There are only three regions that receive industry contributions but this does not offset the 
global increase in abatement. In contrast, when we consider industry and green lobby 
contributions, all regions take contributions from the industry. This has a clear detrimental 
effect for both global abatement and global payoff.  
Secondly, since we do not consider transfers between members of an ICA, such as emission 
trading, we confirm the general picture in the literature: Only small coalitions are stable. In 
our case this is a coalition between Japan and the European Union (EU-15) where 
governments are supported by environmentalist (supergreen or green) and industry 
contributions. This stable coalition does little to close the gap, in terms of abatement and net 
benefits, between the situation without cooperation (singleton coalition structure) and full 
cooperation (grand coalition structure). We find that lobby contributions help to increase 
stability in our model (there are no stable coalitions in our base case). However, with green 
and industry lobby contributions, the stable coalition falls short of achieving the abatement 
level of the singleton coalition structure in the base case. 
Thirdly, we find that, contrary to intuition, industry contributions are compatible with 
membership in an ICA. We observe that in the stable coalition between Japan and EU-15, the 
latter are taking industry contributions. The government of EU-15 goes for a compromise 
increasing its abatement upon joining the coalition but remaining below base case levels. 
Thus, it still collects industry contributions and benefits from the increased global abatement 
as a result of the coalition formation process.  
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Appendix A –Parameters 
Table A.1: Emissions, Benefit and Abatement Cost Parameters* 
Regions Emissions 
in 2010 
(Gton) 
Share of 
global benefits
iμ  
Abatement 
cost parameter 
iξ  
Abatement 
cost parameter
iζ  
1   USA 2.42 0.226 0.0005 0.00398 
2   Japan 0.56 0.173 0.0155 0.18160 
3   European Union (EU-15) 1.4 0.236 0.0024 0.01503 
4   Other OECD Countries (O-OECD) 0.62 0.035 0.0083 0.0 
5   Eastern European Countries (EE) 0.51 0.013 0.0079 0.00486 
6   Former Soviet Union (FSU) 1.0 0.068 0.0023 0.00042 
7   Energy Exporting Countries (EEX) 1.22 0.030 0.0032 0.03029 
8   China 2.36 0.062  0.00007 0.00239 
9   India 0.63 0.050 0.0015 0.00787 
10 Dynamic Asian Economies (DAE) 0.41 0.025 0.0047 0.03774 
11 Brazil 0.13 0.015 0.5612 0.84974 
12 Rest of the World (ROW) 0.7 0.068 0.0021 0.00805 
     World 11.96 1 - - 
Source: Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2006). 
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Appendix B 
From the model outlined in section 2 and the functional specification in section 3 we can 
derive the first order conditions for the singleton coalition structure for different lobby cases. 
For the case without lobby contributions (i.e. the base case) we obtain from [3], [7] and [8] 
2
i B C i i i iq q⎡ ⎤μ δ = δ ξ + ζ⎣ ⎦ .        [B1] 
For a singleton receiving only contributions from the supergreen lobby we obtain from [5], 
[7], [8] and [9] 
2
i B B C i i i iq q⎡ ⎤μ δ + ερδ = δ ξ + ζ⎣ ⎦ .       [B2] 
For a singleton receiving only contributions from the green lobby we obtain from [5], [7], [8] 
and [10] 
2
i B C i i i i(1 ) q q⎡ ⎤μ δ +ρε = δ ξ + ζ⎣ ⎦ .       [B3] 
For a singleton receiving only contributions from the industry lobby we obtain from [5], [7], 
[8] and [11] 
2
i B C i i i i(1 ) q q⎡ ⎤μ δ +ρ = δ ξ + ζ⎣ ⎦ .       [B4] 
The left-hand side of [B1]-[B4] represents the sum of marginal benefits and marginal 
contributions, whereas the right-hand side represents marginal abatement costs. Comparing 
[B1] with [B2] and [B3] we note that a region, acting as a singleton, has a higher abatement 
level than in the base case if it receives contributions from an environmentalist lobby. It has a 
lower abatement level than in the base case if it receives contributions from the industry 
(compare [B1] with [B4]). 
